Bryant v. Holder - U.S. Reply Brief by Holder, Eric
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
1-1-2011
Bryant v. Holder - U.S. Reply Brief
Eric Holder
United States Office of the Attorney General
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Holder, Eric, "Bryant v. Holder - U.S. Reply Brief " (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 313.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/313
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity )
as Attorney General of the United States, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
                                                                                )
Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-76-KS-MTP
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 1 of 52
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -iv-
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1-
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -4-
I. THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISIDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . -4-
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Their Standing To Bring This Suit. -5-
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Unripe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -9-
II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF 
MAY BE GRANTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -11-
A. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail in a Facial Commerce Clause Challenge 
Based on the Notion that the Minimum Coverage Provision 
Regulates “Inactivity”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -11-
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is A Reasonably Adapted Means
to the Legitimate End of Increasing the Affordability and Availability
of Health Care and Health Insurance and Is Therefore a Valid 
Exercise of Necessary and Proper Clause Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -23-
C. Congress Had Independent Authority Under the General Welfare 
Clause To Enact the Minimum Coverage Provision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -31-
D. The § 5000A Penalty Is Not an Unapportioned Capitation Tax 
or a Direct Tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -35-
E. Because Plaintiffs Identify No Fundamental Right Implicated by the 
Minimum Coverage Provision, Their Substantive Due Process Claim 
Must Be Rejected.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -36-
F. Lieutenant Governor Bryant’s Tenth Amendment Claim Should Be 
Dismissed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -39-
1. Lt. Gov. Bryant Lacks Standing To Assert a Tenth 
Amendment Commandeering Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -39-
-ii-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 2 of 52
2. The ACA’s Employer Provisions Do Not Infringe State 
Sovereignty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -40-
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -42-
-iii-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 3 of 52
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
                 Cases
Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Adventure Res., Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786 (4th Cir.  1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10-1033, 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). . . . . . . . . 8, 37
Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (N.Y. Sup. 1891).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Blanchette v. Ct. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
      
City of Madison v. Bear Creek Water Ass’n, 816 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius,728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010). . . . . . . . . 28, 29, 30
Davis v. United States, 597 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 41
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
      
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
       716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 36, 38, 41
Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
      
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
-iv-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 4 of 52
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12, 15, 20, 24
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 542 (1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Kusjanovic v. Oregon, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (D. Or. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Liberty Univ. Inc., v. Geithner,
No. 10-15, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 13, 16, 17
Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 38
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 28
Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530, 2011 WL 148254 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     
Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
N.J. Physicians v. Obama, No. 10-1489, 2010 WL 5060597 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010). . . . . . . . . . 8
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 30
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule,74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
-v-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 5 of 52
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010). . . . . . 8, 13, 16, 17
     
Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    
Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 28, 29, 30
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
    
United States v. Johnson, 652 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D. Miss. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33, 34
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 20, 21, 22, 24
     
-vi-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 6 of 52
United States v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit,363 U.S. 194 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 20, 21
    
United States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34
United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 29
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7
W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Walling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15, 25
Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Statutes 
26 U.S.C. § 4942. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
26 U.S.C. § 4974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
26 U.S.C. § 4980B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
26 U.S.C. § 4980E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
-vii-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 7 of 52
26 U.S.C. § 4980H.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
26 U.S.C. § 5000A.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
26 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6306. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
26 U.S.C. § 6671. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 25
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Legislative Materials
47 Million & Counting: Why the Health Care Marketplace Is Broken: Hearing Before the
     S. Comm. on Finance, 110  Cong. (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19, 28th
155 Cong. Rec. S13,558 (Dec. 20, 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
155 Cong. Rec. S13,751 (Dec. 22, 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
156 Cong. Rec. E506-01, 2010 WL 1133757 (Rep. Waxman) (Mar. 21, 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . 16
156 Cong. Rec. H1824 (Mar. 21, 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
156 Cong. Rec. H1854 (Mar. 21, 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Consequences of Expanded Employee Insurance Selection: Hearing Before 
     the Senate/House Joint Economic Committee, 108  Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004), th
     2004 WL 2107555. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Health Reform in the 21  Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the st
     H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111  Cong. (2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19, 25th
H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(III). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
-viii-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 8 of 52
H.R. Rep. No. 111-443 (2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
S. Rep. No. 111-89 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
                                                          Miscellaneous 
Congressional Budget Office, How Many Lack Health Insurance and For How Long?      
      (May 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Congressional Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals
      (Dec. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Congressional Budget Office, Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the [ACA]
      (Apr. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Council of Economic Advisors, The Economic Case For Health Care Reform (June 2009). . . 19
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics,
      Health, United States, 2009 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics,
       Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health Interview Survey, 2009 
       (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Department of Health and Human Services, Coverage Denied: How the Current Health
       Insurance System Leaves Millions Behind, (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
JCT, Technical Explanation, JCX-18-10 (Mar. 21, 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 34
Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance,
      81 J. Pol. Econ. 251,(1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Milton Friedman, How To Cure Health Care, The Public Interest, Winter 2001. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Pauly, Risks and Benefits in Health Care: The View From Economics, 
       26 Health Affairs 653  (2007).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
-ix-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 9 of 52
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the minimum coverage provision, which plaintiffs challenge in this case,
as part of a comprehensive health care reform scheme. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA” or the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119, 244 (2010) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 5000A). To remedy significant problems in the availability and affordability of health care
and health insurance, the ACA expands government insurance programs and bars private insurers
from denying or charging more for insurance coverage based on the health of the applicant.
Congress enacted the minimum coverage provision as an essential precondition to the ACA’s
reforms of the insurance industry. Without this requirement that individuals maintain a minimum
level of insurance coverage to pay for the health care services that they will later receive, the ACA’s
guarantee of access to insurance would enable individuals to hold off purchasing insurance until they
became ill, leading ultimately to the collapse of the insurance system. In addition, Congress
expressly found that the “economic and financial decision[s]” of some individuals “to forego health
insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A), had shifted billions in
costs to other participants in the health care market when those individuals were unable to pay at the
point when health care expenses arose. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(F). The minimum coverage provision was
intended to alleviate this significant burden on the interstate health care market.
The minimum coverage provision will not go into effect until 2014, and the penalty that
serves as its enforcement mechanism, set forth in § 5000A(b), will not be assessed until 2015, when
taxpayers record it on their tax return and pay it with their 2014 taxes. Plaintiffs insist that they are
certain to incur the § 5000A penalty four years from now, but intent does not establish an impending
injury in this case. The issue is not whether the minimum coverage provision is certain to go into
-1-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 10 of 52
effect, but whether the provision is certain to apply to plaintiffs and whether they are certain not to
satisfy it in three years. Plaintiffs allege no facts to support any such conclusion. Indeed, the
Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) expressly alleges that plaintiff Bryant sues on behalf of a “class
or subclass” of state government employees covered by the state health plan. Under 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(f)(1)(B), (2)(A), individuals covered under such a plan will likely meet the minimum
coverage requirement. Moreover, plaintiffs advance no claim in the Complaint regarding any current
financial effect stemming from the potential future penalty that they assert they will face. Plaintiffs
therefore lack standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision, and their claims are unripe.
Even if this Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it should recognize the 
fundamental fallacy at the heart of plaintiffs’ claims and dismiss those claims on the merits. The
implication of plaintiffs’ argument that the minimum coverage provision falls beyond Congress’s
Article I powers is that only States could impose such a requirement. The well-worn Commerce
Clause jurisprudence seeks to distinguish between what is national (truly related to “interstate
commerce”) and what is local. Under that analysis, the minimum coverage provision clearly falls
on the “national” side of the line. It is an integral part of a comprehensive regulation of the vast
interstate health care market. It regulates the means of payment in that interstate market, where the
dominant means is through health insurance. And it is essential to regulatory reforms in the interstate
health insurance market. Congress’s conclusion that, in the aggregate, uncompensated care has a
substantial effect on the health care market is undeniably rational, given the significant costs that
such care imposes on third parties, including governments, private insurers, and families throughout
the nation that face spiraling premiums and health care bills as a result. 
While plaintiffs invoke the rhetoric of state sovereignty in their Complaint and opposition
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brief, they fail to explain how states could be deemed the only parties that could validly, or even
practically, address the problems in these national markets. And the essence of their argument is not
focused on state sovereignty at all. Instead, the “inactivity” exception that they seek to insert, for the
first time, into Commerce Clause analysis reflects the focus of their real concern as individual
liberty, not state sovereignty. 
The premise of plaintiffs’ argument – that the minimum coverage provision “regulates
inactivity,” and is therefore beyond Congress’s Article I powers –  is simply wrong. The Commerce
Clause empowers Congress to regulate participants in a relevant market, and Congress is entitled
to define the market in which it wishes to regulate. Those regulated by the minimum coverage
provision are participants in the health care market who are faced with the question of how to pay
for the health care that they will almost inevitably receive. Because, as a practical matter, health
insurance must be purchased before health care expenses are incurred, Congress rationally imposed
the requirement to maintain health insurance at the point when individuals face the decision of how
to finance their future health care costs. However, those who would otherwise decide to risk
incurring catastrophic costs that they cannot afford, and shifting those costs to third parties, cannot
be deemed “inactive” in the health care market. Moreover, the provision regulates those who have
insurance as well, specifying the appropriate level of coverage. Those individuals cannot be deemed
inactive even under plaintiffs’ theory. Even if plaintiffs’ “inactivity” argument otherwise had merit,
they could not prevail in a facial challenge solely on that basis because the provision is necessarily
valid when applied to those whom plaintiffs would agree are “active,” and who are a significant
majority of the participants in the health care market. Plaintiffs’ attempt to misconstrue the Supreme
Court’s latest application of the Necessary and Proper Clause must also be rejected, as must their
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assertion that the § 5000A penalty cannot be sustained as a valid tax.
The proper focus of plaintiffs’ individual-liberty claim is not Article I at all, but the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and plaintiffs do raise such a claim. However, the economic
rights that plaintiffs attempt to assert cannot be deemed “fundamental” in the post-Lochner era.
Moreover, their claim that the minimum coverage provision compels them to disclose private
medical information is far fetched, particularly since they assert that they have no intention of
acquiring health insurance, and the nature of information that health insurance companies may
require to enroll in qualifying plans three years from now is unknown. Because the minimum
coverage provision easily satisfies the applicable rational basis review, plaintiffs state no viable
claim on this ground.
The claim that Lieutenant Governor Bryant separately raises and defends must also be
dismissed. The Lieutenant Governor does not explain how he, as an individual, is affected by the
ACA’s regulation of employers. Moreover, his assertion that the application of these requirements
to states is equivalent to “commandeering” states to implement federal policy has no merit. It is well
established that the states are subject to generally applicable federal regulations, and the application
of federal requirements to employee benefit programs is a commonplace that has absolutely no
impact on state sovereignty.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs cite the wrong standard for reviewing the jurisdictional issues that defendants raise
in their Motion to Dismiss. Dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is governed by
Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 12(b)(6) and is appropriate where “it appears certain that the plaintiff
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cannot prove a plausible set of facts that establish subject-matter jurisdiction.” Davis v. United
States, 597 F.3d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiffs bear the burden to
establish the Court’s jurisdiction.  Id. (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
2001)). Moreover, the “plausibility standard” that the Supreme Court has explained in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), applies to
standing and ripeness, and requires that a complaint contain sufficient factual allegations to establish
an Article III case or controversy,  if true. White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2010). 
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Their Standing To Bring This Suit
Plaintiffs do not meet their burden to establish standing. In their Complaint, plaintiffs assert
that they currently have no health insurance and “have no intention” of complying with the
minimum coverage provision when it goes into effect in 2014. Comp. ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiffs therefore
rest their standing to challenge the provision solely on the notion that they face a “credible threat”
of owing a penalty when they file their tax returns in 2015. See id. ¶ 27.  As explained in defendants’
opening brief, this proclaimed intent is insufficient to establish an “actual or imminent” injury in
fact, as Article III requires. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Op. Br.,” dkt.
#14) at 8 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Plaintiffs fail to assert
a single fact to suggest, much less demonstrate, that they are “immediately in danger of sustaining”
any direct injury as a result of the minimum coverage provision’s possible enforcement against them
more than four years in the future. Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir.
2008). 
In their opposition brief, plaintiffs again rely, for standing purposes, solely on the notion that
they are certain to incur a penalty after the minimum coverage provision goes into effect in 2014. 
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However, they fail to provide any genuine support for this supposed certainty. For example,
plaintiffs rely heavily on a congressional budgetary projection, estimating that around four million
people will pay the § 5000A penalty in the year 2017, after failing to maintain the required level of
health insurance coverage during the previous year. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (“Pl. Opp.,” dkt. #20) at 9-10 (citing Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), Payments of
Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the [ACA] (Apr. 2010)). Given that the population of the
United States is approximately 307 million, this projection fails to establish that plaintiffs
themselves are likely to incur the penalty. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (injury must be
to plaintiffs “themselves as individuals”); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991) (a plaintiff
“must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself” and must “maintain a ‘personal stake’ in the
outcome of the litigation throughout its course” (internal quotation omitted)). The predicate for
incurring the penalty is being subject to and violating the minimum coverage provision, and
plaintiffs plead no facts suggesting that they will fall within the scope of the provision and outside
its exemptions, and that they will not otherwise satisfy its requirements, for example, by qualifying
for Medicare.
Whatever plaintiffs’ current intentions might be, they cannot assert a plausible – much less
certain – likelihood of future injury due to the § 5000A penalty when their claim is entirely
dependent on an untenable assumption –  that their current health, employment, and financial status
will not change between the time they filed suit and 2014. This case differs from Village of
Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2004), where a court determined that three
municipalities in the Chicago vicinity had standing to challenge a Chicago airport fee that was not
scheduled to go into effect for 13 years. Id. at 1119. There, the court concluded that the
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municipalities’ injuries were “‘certainly impending’” because the municipalities paid for their
employees’ business travel, and would therefore undoubtedly incur these fees after the fees went into
effect. See id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). Here, on the other hand,
whether plaintiffs will incur § 5000A penalties in the future is governed by circumstances that, by
their very nature, cannot be predicted. 
An asserted injury is “too remote temporally” when the time period that will pass before any
injury could be sustained is sufficiently long that a plaintiff’s relevant circumstances might
reasonably change within that period. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 226 (2003). Thus, in
McConnell, the Supreme Court recognized that five years was too far into the future to predict
whether a particular Senator would run for reelection. Id. Similarly here, a period of years is too long
a time to predict whether a particular individual will find a different job that provides qualifying
insurance, or sustain significant health care expenses causing the individual to desire health
insurance, or experience economic hardship causing the individual to be exempt from any penalty
under § 5000A. Any number of unexpected events could occur in a person’s life during a single
year, and each year beyond that only compounds the uncertainty. While plaintiffs might now have
every intention of “resist[ing] the statute,” Pl. Opp. at 6, neither they nor the Court can rely on
plaintiffs’ current intentions – supported by no facts other than the bald assertion that they currently
lack insurance, Comp. ¶ 26; but see id. ¶ 97 (indicating plaintiff Lieutenant Governor Bryant does
in fact have insurance) – as establishing a genuine probability of future injury.  Even at the pleading
stage, “‘naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement’” are insufficient to establish
standing. White, 601 F.3d at 552 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at1949). Moreover, “allegations of injury
that is merely conjectural or hypothetical” also do not suffice. Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533,
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540 (5th Cir. 2009). Just as a dependence on decisions of third parties moved the plaintiffs’ claims
of injury in Little from the realm of plausibility into the sphere of pure conjecture, see id., so too
does the dependence here of plaintiffs’ claims on unknowable future events.1
Courts in other districts have dismissed challenges by individuals to the minimum coverage
provision for lack of standing because the plaintiffs’ asserted future injury – similar to the injury
alleged here – was too speculative. See N.J. Physicians v. Obama, No. 10-1489, 2010 WL 5060597,
at *4 (D.N.J.  Dec. 8, 2010); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10-1033, 2010 WL 3418436, at *9 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 27, 2010). Unlike some plaintiffs in other cases involving the ACA, plaintiffs here do not
allege that they are “being compelled to reorganize their affairs” now, or that they have decided “to
forego certain spending today, so that they will have the funds to pay for health insurance” when the
minimum coverage provision goes into effect in 2014. Thomas More Law Center (“TMLC”) v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889 (E.D. Mich. 2010); see also Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-15,
2010 WL 4860299, at *5-7 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). The absence of any concrete information
about any present injury here squarely distinguishes this case from others in which courts have found
The other cases cited by the court in Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 7161
F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1144-47 (N.D. Fla. 2010), are inapplicable here for similar reasons. For example,
in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925), the Supreme Court held that a private
school had standing to challenge a compulsory-public-education law that would take effect in two
years where the school had already lost income from students withdrawing in anticipation of the
law’s enforcement; the Court apparently deemed the possibility that the school might close down
for other reasons before the law went into effect to be too remote to deprive the school of standing,
while explaining that if the challenged law forced the school out of business, the injury would be
irreparable. In contrast, the possibility that individuals will suffer changes to their health,
employment, or financial status within a four-year period, while impossible to predict, could hardly
be considered “remote.” The Florida court’s discounting of the potential impact of the “‘vagaries’
of life”on the plaintiffs in that case fails to acknowledge what the Supreme Court recognized in
McConnell – that even unpredictable “vagaries” become more likely over a longer period of time
and, in circumstances such as this one, prevent an asserted future injury from being considered
“certainly impending.”
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standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision.2
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Unripe
For similar reasons, plaintiffs fail to establish that their claim is ripe. Because there is a
genuine possibility that plaintiffs’ circumstances may change before the minimum coverage
provision takes effect in 2014, their asserted injury rests on “contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains no factual
allegations that, if true, could establish with any certainty that they will face a § 5000A penalty in
2015, and their claim is therefore unripe. Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-64
(1967).
In their opposition brief, plaintiffs’ sole arguments in favor of ripeness rest on inapplicable
or incorrect standards. First, plaintiffs argue that their claim is ripe because they face a “threat of
prosecution.” See Pl. Opp. at 6. However, as indicated in the case that plaintiffs cite, that standard
applies only when a plaintiff seeks to challenge a law imposing criminal penalties. See, e.g., Trimble
v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (W.D. La. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff could raise
a preenforcement challenge to criminal ordinance on First Amendment grounds). Because the
minimum coverage provision imposes no criminal penalty, plaintiffs face no “threat of prosecution”
under the provision. 
In their Complaint, plaintiffs make reference to “plan[ning]”, “invest[ing],” and “sav[ing],”2
but they do not indicate whether any of the plaintiffs are currently engaged in any of those activities,
or whether, if they are, it is due to the minimum coverage provision. Comp. ¶ 27. In any event,
planning, saving, or investing do not entail any immediate loss or harm such that they could qualify
as concrete injuries in fact, and plaintiffs’ opposition brief does not purport to rely on those
allegations to establish standing.
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Second, plaintiffs attempt to analogize this case to others where courts concluded that a
preenforcement statutory challenge in the civil context was ripe because the statute’s enforcement
was “inevitab[le]” or “certain.” Pl. Opp. at 11 (citing Blanchette v. Ct. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S.
102, 143 (1974); Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1164 (11th Cir.
2008)). However, the courts in those cases emphasized that it must be inevitable or certain that the 
statute would be enforced against the plaintiffs themselves, or their members. See Blanchette, 419
U.S. at 143 (statutory challenge was ripe where statute would inevitably operate “against certain
individuals,” including plaintiffs); Browning, 522 F.3d at 1164 (“Since enforcement of [the
challenged provision] is automatic for all new voter registrants, there is no doubt that the statute will
be enforced against some of plaintiffs’ members.”). Here, plaintiffs suggest that because they
currently do not have the minimum essential coverage required by the ACA and have no intention
of obtaining such coverage, they will inevitably incur the § 5000A penalty. Pl. Opp. at 9, 11.
However, for the same reasons explained above, it is neither inevitable nor certain that the minimum
coverage provision will be enforced against plaintiffs. Indeed, it is far from certain that any of these
plaintiffs’ circumstances, as they are relevant to decisions or options regarding health insurance
coverage or qualification for an exemption, will not change during the years before the provision
goes into effect.3
Defendants do not, for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, intend to pursue the argument3
in Part I, B of their opening brief, in which defendants contended that plaintiffs claims are barred
by the Anti-Injunction Act.
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II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE
GRANTED4
A. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail in a Facial Commerce Clause Challenge Based on the
Notion that the Minimum Coverage Provision Regulates “Inactivity”
The minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power. The 
provision regulates the means of payment for the health care that almost all Americans, including
plaintiffs, unquestionably receive. As explained in defendants’ opening brief, Congress had a
rational basis to conclude that, in the aggregate, the receipt of health care services without having
previously obtained health insurance has a “substantial economic effect,” Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 17 (2005), on the interstate health care market. Def. Op. Br. at 24-28. By requiring that
individuals who are already in the health care market pay for the care they receive by maintaining
a minimum level of health insurance, the minimum coverage provision is designed to prevent the
shifting of tens of billions of dollars in costs to others, including the majority of people who already
pay for their care through insurance. Congress also had a rational basis to conclude that the
minimum coverage provision is an “integral part” of the comprehensive health insurance reforms
that it adopted in the ACA, see Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 210 (5th Cir.
2000), and that failure to regulate the manner of payment would “undercut the regulation of the
interstate market” in health care, see Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. Def. Op. Br. at 21-24. In particular, the
provision’s requirement of universal coverage is essential to the viability of the ACA’s guaranteed
issue and community rating reforms, which prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage
or adjusting rates based on an individual’s medical history or current health status.
Plaintiffs’ opposition brief does not attempt to defend the merits of their argument that the4
minimum coverage provision is an unconstitutional taking. That argument should therefore be
deemed waived, and it is in any event without merit. See Def. Op. Br. at 31-33.
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Plaintiffs do not contest Congress’s findings regarding the substantial costs that uninsured
individuals, as a class, pass on to others when they receive uncompensated care.  Nor do they5
dispute Congress’s conclusion that the minimum coverage provision is essential to the ACA’s
insurance reforms. Rather than address the applicable Commerce Clause analysis, plaintiffs seek to
distinguish the minimum coverage provision from other legitimate regulations of interstate
commerce on grounds that are not only unprecedented but also dead wrong. 
Plaintiffs rely on the fallacy that the minimum coverage provision is a regulation of
“inactivity,” Pl. Opp. at 29, and an effort to “compel commerce” where there otherwise would be
no commercial transaction, id. at 32. Plaintiffs point to no Commerce Clause case that has drawn
a distinction between regulation of “activity” and regulation of “inactivity.” The lack of any
authority for the new test that plaintiffs propose is not surprising, given that the focus of any
Commerce Clause analysis is on determining whether the object of the federal government’s
regulation is sufficiently interstate in character. The Supreme Court’s three-part list of permissible
subjects of federal regulation – (1) “channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “instrumentalities” or
“persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) “activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 16-17 – is meant to distinguish between “what is truly local” (and
thus properly reserved to state regulation) and “what is truly national.” United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)). Plaintiffs surely
do not intend to suggest that a state, unlike the federal government, would have absolute power to
While Congress is entitled to consider substantial effects “in the aggregate,” without regard5
to any particular individual’s circumstance, Raich, 545 U.S. at 22, none of the plaintiffs here deny
that any one of them could, if they remain uninsured, incur health care costs that are beyond their
ability to pay. 
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force citizens to buy any consumer products that the state chooses to require, but that suggestion is
necessarily implicit in their argument as formulated under the Commerce Clause. That result makes
no sense. Plaintiffs’ “inactivity” argument is, in truth, simply a reformulation of their substantive
due process argument. The Due Process Clause, not the Commerce Clause, is the constitutional
provision that protects against government infringements on individual liberty.
Beyond the fact that plaintiffs here are attempting to introduce an entirely novel “inactivity
exception” to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, plaintiffs’ position is factually wrong.
The subject of Congress’s regulation through the minimum coverage provision does not qualify as
“inactivity” in any sense. Nowhere in their Complaint or opposition brief do plaintiffs deny that they
use health care, and that, by using these services and paying for them, if they can, they are
participants in the health care market. Indeed, almost all Americans, “as living, breathing beings,
who do not oppose medical services on religious grounds,” are participants in this market and
“cannot opt out” of it. TMLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894; see also Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299,
at *15 (“Nearly everyone will require health care services at some point in their lifetimes . . . .”).6
Participation in a relevant market is sufficiently “active” for Commerce Clause purposes.
The key point that plaintiffs appear to miss is that the health care market is the relevant
Those who have a religious objection to medical care may legitimately claim to be6
nonparticipants in the health care services market. Such individuals are, of course, exempt from the
minimum coverage provision. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2). Otherwise, there may be extremely rare
individuals who, despite having no objection, will never seek medical care during their lifetimes,
but  it is impossible to know who these individuals are until their lives are over. Plaintiffs do not
dispute the universal nature of participation in the health care market, nor could they, and the Court
may take judicial notice of it. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”),
National Center for Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health
Interview Survey, 2009, tbl. 35 (2010); CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United
States, 2009, at 318, tbl. 80 (2010) (indicating that, in recent years, between 60 and 80 percent of
the uninsured have visited a doctor or emergency room at least once within a twelve-month period).
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market. Plaintiffs’ claim is that they are not currently in the market for health insurance, and that by
requiring individuals to maintain a certain level of insurance, the minimum coverage provision
“mandates that individuals affirmatively engage in economic activity where they might otherwise
choose not to.” Pl. Opp. at 25. Plaintiffs focus solely on one market and ignore the enormous
nationwide market that was the principal focus of Congress’s regulation. Even if plaintiffs do not
currently participate in the insurance market, they indisputably participate in the market for health
care services. Nothing required Congress to focus exclusively on the market that plaintiffs define,
and nothing barred Congress from focusing on economic conduct in the health care market. 
Requirements to obtain insurance are not imposed because of participation in the insurance market
itself; they are imposed because of concerns that individuals or corporations may be unable to meet
costs resulting from activities in other markets. Under plaintiffs’ logic, Congress would be
constitutionally precluded from applying any insurance requirement to anyone who is not already
insured, on the theory that such people are not “active” in the insurance market — a proposition
without support in precedent, practice, or common sense. Plaintiffs’ attempt to dismiss the
interrelationship between health insurance and the health care market as “a series of unsubstantiated
and unquantifiable inferences,” Pl. Opp. at 34, should be soundly rejected. 
A Commerce Clause analysis requires a practical understanding of how the market at issue
operates. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 572 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s adoption of “a
practical conception of the commerce power”); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120
(1942) (“[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula
which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and
foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce.”);
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Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (“commerce among the states is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business”); cf. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-337 (1962) (Congress chose in the Clayton Act to
“prescribe[] a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal,
legalistic one”). In Wickard and Raich – both involving, as this case does, a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme addressed to broad interstate markets – the Court focused on the operation of the
markets at issue – the market for wheat, in Wickard, and the market for controlled substances, in
Raich. In each case, the Court ultimately deferred to Congress’s determination that its regulation of
the class that included the plaintiffs in those cases – whether by penalizing excess consumption of
home-grown wheat or by prohibiting the home production and possession of marijuana – was
essential to its regulatory scheme, and that the regulated activity, in the aggregate, substantially
affected interstate commerce. Raich, 545 U.S. at 13-14, 22; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29. 
A similar analysis should lead this Court to a similar conclusion in this case. Plaintiffs’
attempt to draw an impermeable line separating participation in the health market from the
maintenance of insurance coverage ignores the fundamental feature and essential function of health
insurance. As Congress understood, health insurance exists not as an independent consumer product
but as the dominant means of payment for health care services.   Implicitly or otherwise, individuals7
See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. Pol. Econ.7
251, 253 (1973) (“Health insurance is purchased not as a final consumption good but as a means of
paying for the future stochastic purchases of health services.”). The sole purpose of many types of
insurance is to provide protection “against events that are highly unlikely to occur but involve large
losses if they do occur.” Milton Friedman, How To Cure Health Care, The Public Interest, Winter
2001, at 10. There is certainly a risk of unpredictable, catastrophically high expenses in the health
care context. At the same time, “it has become common to rely on insurance to pay for regular
medical examinations and often for prescriptions.” Id. at 10. This reality reflects the fact that the
costs associated with even the most common health problems can quickly reach thousands of dollars.
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engage in economic assessments of the relative advantages of obtaining insurance versus other
means of attempting to pay for health care services, although those assessments often ignore or
underestimate the risks. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (62% of all personal bankruptcies are
caused in part by medical expenses); Pauly, Risks and Benefits in Health Care: The View From
Economics, 26 Health Affairs 653, 658 (2007). Significantly, it is the conduct of the uninsured, due
to their participation in the health care market, that Congress identified as having a substantial
economic effect, due to the significant amount of uncompensated care that the uninsured receive,
which shifts costs to others and drives up prices of both health care services and health insurance
premiums. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). Congress found that the amount of shifted costs due to the
aggregate impact of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured in 2008 was $43 billion, and
found that these costs were passed from providers “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to
families,” raising premiums “by an average of over $1,000 a year.” Id.; see also 156 Cong. Rec.
E506-01, 2010 WL 1133757 (Rep. Waxman) (Mar. 21, 2010). In California, for example, an
estimated ten percent of the cost of health insurance premiums is attributable to uncompensated care
consumed by people without insurance.  S. Rep. No. 111-89 at 2 (2009). Thus, as other courts have
rightly recognized, “decisions whether to purchase insurance or to attempt to pay for health care out
of pocket” are “plainly economic” and, “in the aggregate, have clear and direct impacts on health
care providers, taxpayers, and the insured population who ultimately pay for the care provided to
those who go without insurance.” TMLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Indeed, “[a]s Congress found, the
total incidence of these economic decisions has a substantial impact on the national market for health
International Federation of Health Plans, 2010 Comparative Price Report: Medical and Hospital Fees
By Country.
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care by collectively shifting billions of dollars on to other market participants and driving up the
prices of insurance policies.” Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15. 
Plaintiffs therefore miss the mark when they argue that Congress cannot regulate decisions
about how to pay for health care services because “a decision” is nothing but a “mental process
which may, or may not, result in activity.” Pl. Opp. at 33. The decision at issue here is not a decision
about whether to enter the health care market; rather, as Congress explicitly found, it is the decision
how and when to pay for health care services that the regulated individuals will inevitably receive.
See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A). Because individuals cannot “decide” not to become ill or have an
accident, those who have no religious objection cannot simply “decide,” as a matter of volition, not
to participate in the health care market, and indeed, plaintiffs do not allege that they have made any
such decision. As a practical matter, of course, those who pay for health care with insurance must
obtain the insurance before health care costs are incurred, and before the extent of those costs are
known with certainty.  Thus, Congress imposed the minimum coverage requirement at the point8
when individuals are able to make the decision to pay for their health care through insurance, which
is before they actually receive care. Congress’s conclusion that “decisions about how and when
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased,” by individuals who are active
participants in the health care market, are “economic and financial” activities that substantially affect
For this reason, those who do not obtain health insurance before health care needs arise must8
face the prospect of attempting to pay their health care expenses out of pocket, whether or not they
have consciously decided that such a payment method is their preference. Congress’s use of the term
“decisions” in 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A) simply reflects the fact that, in this context, an
individual’s means of payment is necessarily determined before expenses are incurred. There is no
real option to choose “inactivity” because, ultimately, the individual will incur those expenses. “‘Far
from ‘inactivity,’ by choosing to forgo insurance, Plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try
to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the purchase of
insurance.’” Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (quoting TMLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894).
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interstate commerce, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A), again reflects Congress’s understanding of how
health insurance functions as a means of payment in the health care market. Almost every American
participates in the health care market and is therefore faced with managing the financial risks
associated with unpredictable future health care costs. As a class, however, those participants in the
market who do not have insurance end up passing their costs on to others. It does not matter that not
every uninsured person will shift health care costs in any given year. Millions will do so, and the
cumulative impact of such cost-shifting is to impose a multi-billion dollar annual burden on
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where “Congress decides that the
‘total incidence’ of a practice” — here, the practice of consuming health care without insurance —
“poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (citing
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971)). The record supports Congress’s conclusion
that the uninsured’s participation in the health care market, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.
The record also supports the conclusion that the minimum coverage provision is essential
to the ACA’s guaranteed issue and community rating reforms. Although insurance coverage is
crucial to a consumer’s ability to pay for health care, escalating costs have made health insurance
increasingly unaffordable, “driv[ing] people out of the insurance market.” 47 Million and Counting:
Why the Health Care Marketplace Is Broken: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th
Cong. 49 (2008) (statement of Mark Hall, Prof. of Law & Public Health, Wake Forest Univ.). The
resulting smaller risk pool further contributes to an ongoing “premium spiral.” Health Reform in the
21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th
Cong. 118-19 (2009) (American Academy of Actuaries); see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. II, at
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985 (2010). Thus, in the absence of the ACA’s reforms, “[t]he market for health insurance . . . is not
a well-functioning market.” Council of Economic Advisors, The Economic Case For Health Care
Reform 16 (June 2009); see also Health Reform in the 21st Century, at 49-50 (statement of Dr. Linda
Blumberg, Urban Institute) (describing “shortcomings” in health insurance market). The problem
is in large part due to the insurance industry’s practice of “medical underwriting,” whereby
individuals seeking insurance are screened, and their eligibility and premium levels are established
based on their health status or history. See id.; Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Coverage
Denied: How the Current Health Insurance System Leaves Millions Behind, at 1 (2009). The ACA
addresses these harsh underwriting practices by barring insurance companies from denying or
revoking coverage or setting premiums based on medical condition.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg-3.
However, these guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements would not work in a
regulatory scheme that permits health care consumers to time their insurance purchases based on
their current cost-benefit evaluations. Indeed, a “health insurance market could never survive or
even form if people could buy their insurance on the way to the hospital.”  47 Million and Counting,
110th Cong. 52 (2008) (Prof. Hall). Congress found that, absent the minimum coverage requirement,
“many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 18091(a)(2)(I). Congress thus found the requirement “essential to creating effective health
insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.”
Id. § 18091(a)(2)(J). That determination, like Congress’s determination regarding the costs of
uncompensated care, is supported by the legislative record, and plaintiffs do not even attempt to
contest its rationality.
The Court must defer to these legislative judgments, in light of both separation of powers
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principles and Congress’s superior capacity to make empirical judgments and operational choices.
Courts owe “Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution is far better equipped than
the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.”
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). “This
principle has special significance in cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments
concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity[.]” Id. at 196.  Moreover, courts “owe
Congress’ findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the
legislative power,” lest a court “infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive
judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.” Id. Here, then, the Court “need not
determine” whether decisions to forgo health insurance and instead attempt to pay for health care
out of pocket, “taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. Congress’s findings and
the legislative record leave no doubt that the minimum coverage provision regulates economic
conduct that has enormous impact on interstate commerce. 
The other arguments scattered within plaintiffs’ overarching “inactivity” discussion are all
without merit. Plaintiffs argue that the minimum coverage provision is “even further removed” from
Congress’s commerce power than the statutory provisions that the Supreme Court struck down in
Lopez and Morrison. Pl. Opp. at 30. However, the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison were
stand-alone measures that involved no form of economic regulation. In Lopez, the Supreme Court
struck down a ban on possession of a handgun in a school zone because the ban was related to
economic activity only insofar as the presence of guns near schools might impair learning, which
in turn might undermine economic productivity.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Similarly, in Morrison, the
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Court invalidated a tort cause of action established by the Violence Against Women Act, explaining
that it would require a chain of speculative assumptions to connect gender-motivated violence with
interstate commerce.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16. Neither of these measures played any role in
a broader regulation of economic activity.  Indeed, the “noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct
at issue was central” to the Court’s decisions.  Id. at 610.
The minimum coverage provision is not a stand-alone measure. It is part of a broad economic
regulation of health care financing in the massive interstate health care market, and it is essential to
the Act’s regulation of underwriting practices in the insurance industry. Nor does the minimum
coverage provision regulate non-economic conduct. Rather, it addresses the means of payment for
health care services in a market that accounts for one-sixth of the nation’s GDP. Indeed, it is difficult
to conceive of legislation that is more clearly economic than the regulation of the means of payment
for health care services and the requirements placed on insurers, employers, and individuals who are
made insurable by federal law. Far from the chain of attenuated reasoning required in Lopez and
Morrison to identify any substantial effect on interstate commerce, the link to interstate commerce
in this case is direct and compelling.
Plaintiffs’ “slippery slope” arguments, see Pl. Opp. at 25, ignore the factors unique to the
health care market that distinguish the exercise of Congress’s commerce power in that context.
Plaintiffs suggest that, if the minimum coverage provision were deemed constitutional,  Congress
would have unlimited power “to compel the purchase of goods and services,” such as vitamin
supplements. Id. Unlike health insurance, however, the ordinary “good” or “service” is not itself a
method of payment for services that necessarily will be rendered. Those who do not buy vitamin
supplements might have poorer health, which might lead to greater health care costs, but those costs
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will not be shifted to others – unless the individuals who do not buy vitamins are also uninsured.
Moreover, even if the failure to take vitamins might have some other attenuated impact on interstate
commerce, the difference here is that Congress found that the effects of being uninsured are direct
– people who do not have insurance incur billions in health care costs for which they do not pay.
Congress did not need to “pile inference upon inference” to link the regulated activity and interstate
commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The limitations here derive from the unique combination of
features that characterize the health care market. The near universal participation in that market, the
unpredictable risks of incurring enormous medical expenses at unpredictable times, the general
requirement that hospitals provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay, and the prevalence
and enormous impact of cost shifting yield an airtight connection between the minimum coverage
provision and interstate commerce, a connection replicated in no other market.
Because the minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I
authority, it does not violate the Tenth Amendment. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156
(1992). Indeed, as plaintiffs’ focus on their rights, as ostensibly “inactive” individuals, to be free
from government-compelled purchases makes clear, their argument has nothing to do with the Tenth
Amendment, despite the significant rhetorical emphasis that they place on principles of federalism.
Again, plaintiffs’ arguments here mirror their substantive due process claim that their “right not to
enter into a contract” has been violated – a claim without legal support since the Lochner era, as
explained below.   
Finally, even if this Court entirely disregarded Congress’s understanding of the relationship
between health insurance and the health care market  and concluded that plaintiffs themselves, who
claim that they have no insurance and do not plan to acquire it, are not participants in a relevant
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market and are therefore “inactive,” there is no doubt that the vast majority of people subject to the
minimum coverage provision already have some form of health insurance and thus could not be
deemed “inactive” even under plaintiffs’ theory. See Pl. Opp. at 26 (“It is undoubtedly true that the
purchase of health insurance . . . [is] economic activity as contemplated by Raich.”). Those
individuals are also regulated by the minimum coverage provision insofar as they may (unless they
qualify for an exception) be required to continue to maintain coverage, and to maintain coverage that
qualifies as “minimum essential coverage” under the ACA. Indeed, even the category of the
“uninsured” is not static. The same individuals who are uninsured now are likely to have been
insured within the past year or to acquire insurance within the next year. CBO, How Many Lack
Health Insurance and For How Long? at 4, 9 (May 2003), available at
www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=4210&type=1; see also CBO, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health
Insurance Proposals 11 (Dec. 2008). Those who have recently had insurance or are planning to
acquire it in the near future would also fall into the “active” category even under plaintiffs’ theory.
Plaintiffs therefore cannot possibly prevail in this facial challenge to the minimum coverage
provision based solely on the notion that the provision regulates “inactivity” – which is the only
argument that they make. Even under their theory, they cannot “establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all
of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)
(internal quotation omitted).
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Reasonably Adapted Means to the
Legitimate End of Increasing the Affordability and Availability of Health Care
and Health Insurance and Is Therefore a Valid Exercise of Necessary and
Proper Clause Authority
Plaintiffs do not dispute that people who obtain health care services without insurance shift
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substantial costs to other market participants; nor do they dispute the centrality of the minimum
coverage provision to the ACA’s broader regulation of medical underwriting. Essentially, plaintiffs’ 
challenge focuses narrowly on the means by which Congress determined to regulate payment in the
interstate market for health care services. Governing precedent leaves no room for plaintiffs’
invitation to override Congress’s judgment about the appropriate means to achieve its legitimate
regulatory objectives. 
“[T]he Federal ‘[g]overnment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers,’” but
“at the same time, ‘a government, entrusted with such’ powers ‘must also be entrusted with ample
means for their execution.’” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405, 408 (1819)). Invoking this time-honored
precept that undergirds the Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice Scalia has explained that “where
Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power
needed to make that regulation effective.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)). The
“relevant inquiry” in a Necessary and Proper Clause analysis “is simply ‘whether the means chosen
are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under
other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.”  Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. at 1957 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)). A challenged provision must be upheld if it is “rationally
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” Id. at 1956 (citing Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; and Hodel
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
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Congress’s “legitimate end,” through the ACA’s insurance reforms, was to increase the
affordability and availability of health insurance and health care and the fairness of the process by
which they are made available. That end – which ultimately focuses on pricing and related factors
– is clearly justified under Congress’s commerce power. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128 (“It is well
established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to
regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such
prices.”); see United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (recognizing
Congress’s power to regulate the “business of insurance”); United States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214, 238
(5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing Congress’s power to regulate “[t]he provision of medical services”).
Moreover, the minimum coverage provision is a reasonably adapted means to that end. As
discussed, the ACA’s insurance reforms, among other things, bar insurance companies from refusing
to cover, or charging higher premiums to, individuals with pre-existing medical conditions. 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg-3. Those reforms are intended to regulate interstate markets by increasing
the availability and affordability of health insurance and, as a result, health care services. Yet,
without the minimum coverage provision, Congress determined, the ACA would amplify incentives
to forgo insurance until substantial health care needs arise. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). This would
result in a smaller insurance risk pool, which would only serve to accelerate the spiraling health care
and health insurance costs that the current health care system is already experiencing. Health Reform
in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
111th Cong. 118-19 (Apr. 22, 2009) (Am. Academy of Actuaries). Thus, Congress found the
minimum coverage provision  “essential” to its broader effort through the ACA to increase the
availability and affordability of health care. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(C) (provision will contribute
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to increase in supply of and demand for health care services), (F) (provision will contribute to
lowering health insurance premiums), (G) (provision will improve financial security), (H) (provision
is essential part of “regulating health insurance”), (I) (provision is essential to “creating effective
health insurance markets” that are guaranteed issue regardless of pre-existing conditions), (J)
(provision is essential to eliminating underwriting and associated administrative costs). 
Congress’s choice of the minimum coverage provision as the means to make the ACA’s
guaranteed issue and community rating reforms viable was dictated by, and tailored to, the unique
features of the health care market. As explained, virtually all people, including plaintiffs, participate
in this market. In contrast to other markets, the timing and amount of expenditures are highly
unpredictable.  “Most medical expenses for people under 65” result “from the bolt-from-the-blue
event of an accident, a stroke, or a complication of pregnancy that we know will happen on average
but whose victim we cannot (and they cannot) predict well in advance.”  Consequences of Expanded
Employee Insurance Selection: Hearing Before the Senate/House Joint Economic Committee, 108th
Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004) (Prof. Pauly), 2004 WL 2107555. When health care needs do arise
unexpectedly, our system of health care allows individuals to receive extraordinarily expensive
services without regard to their ability to pay.
Federal and state law reflect the widely shared understanding that access to medical
treatment cannot properly be restricted in the same way as access to other goods and services. Even
before the enactment of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act in 1986, state
courts and legislatures had responded to the changing role of private hospitals and of emergency
rooms by creating tort liability for the failure to provide emergency services. The common law had
long recognized limitations on a physician’s ability to abandon treatment regardless of a patient’s
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ability to pay, but recognized no duty on the part of private physicians to provide care in the first
place.  Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (N.Y. Sup. 1891). The common law has evolved, however,
to preclude hospitals from turning away patients with emergency needs because they are unable to
pay for services. The “modern rule is that liability on the part of a private hospital may be based
upon the refusal of service to a patient in a case of unmistakable medical emergency.” Walling v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 736, 735 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). In addition to “state court rulings
impos[ing] a common law duty on doctors and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care,” by
1985 “at least 22 states [had] enacted statutes or issued regulations requiring the provision of limited
medical services whenever an emergency situation exists[.]” H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(III), at 5,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 727. These measures were not adequate, however, to prevent
hospitals from diverting patients or discharging them prematurely. Congress thus enacted EMTALA
in order “to prevent hospitals from dumping patients who suffered from an emergency medical
condition because they lacked insurance to pay the medical bills.”  Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp.,
895 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(I), at 27, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 605).  The federal statute augmented the duties imposed under state law by
requiring all hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize any
patient who arrives with an emergency condition without regard to ability to pay.  42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd; see also Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999) (per curiam).
Insurance requirements in the health care market thus cannot be imposed as a condition of
receiving health care services, in the same way that state laws make automobile insurance a
condition of driving a vehicle. As EMTALA’s enactment demonstrates, in our society, it would be
entirely unacceptable to restrict emergency room access to those who can show  that they are
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covered by health insurance. Moreover, as noted, with health insurance, timing is critical.  A health
insurance market could never survive “if people could simply buy their insurance on the way to the
hospital.”  47 Million and Counting, at 14 (Prof. Hall).  To be practical and ethical, a requirement
to obtain medical insurance must therefore apply before the medical services are actually needed.
The minimum coverage provision therefore falls well within Congress’s authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition are without merit. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Comstock did not change the applicable Necessary and Proper Clause
analysis, which has been in place since M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. See United States v.
DeCay, 620 F.3d 534, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing the Supreme Court’s recognition in Comstock that
the Necessary and Proper Clause vests Congress with “broad authority” to carry into execution its
enumerated powers); see also United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Comstock as authority to apply the traditional Necessary and Proper Clause analysis).  While9
plaintiffs attempt to insert the question of state sovereignty into the analysis, the Necessary and
Proper Clause does not contain any affirmative obligation that Congress “accommodate” state
In failing to uphold the minimum coverage provision as a valid exercise of Congress’s9
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the court in Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 779, 782 (E.D. Va. 2010), did not suggest that Comstock altered the Necessary
and Proper Clause analysis. At the same time, the court did not correctly apply that analysis; rather,
it appears that the Virginia court  regarded the minimum coverage provision as both the “end” that
Congress sought to achieve, and the “means” through which Congress sought to achieve it. See id.
(concluding that the minimum coverage provision did not fall within Congress’s authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause because it was “beyond the historical reach of the Commerce Clause”).
Its conclusion that neither were legitimate is therefore circular. However, as explained, Congress’s
“end” in enacting the minimum coverage provision – to make the ACA’s insurance reforms effective
in order to increase the affordability and availability of both insurance and health care – was
undeniably legitimate. A requirement that all qualifying participants in the health care market pay
for the services they receive through insurance is a reasonably-adapted means to that end.
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interests. Rather, the line between what is national and what is local is drawn at the outset, when
determining whether the “end” sought is within another enumerated power, such as the Commerce
Clause. Significantly, plaintiffs provide no explanation of why states should be uniquely empowered
to require individuals to obtain health insurance, given the indisputable fact that the health insurance
and health care services markets are interstate markets. See S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at
553. The fact that Congress chose, in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, to allow states to regulate
insurance as well, even though it is an interstate market, in no way weakens Congress’s authority
in this area. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981).
Plaintiffs also suggest that defendants are attempting to employ the Necessary and Proper
clause as “a bootstrap by which Congress may evade the constitutional limits on its enumerated
powers.” Pl. Opp. at 42. But plaintiffs get things backwards. The Court in Comstock recognized that
whether Congress’s exercise of its Necessary and Proper Clause authority is otherwise “prohibited
by the Constitution” depends on the statute’s “validity under provisions of the Constitution other
than the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation omitted). The question of whether the minimum coverage provision violates some other
constitutional provision, such as the Due Process Clause, is one a court would answer in considering
a claim raised under that provision. But the question has no bearing on whether the provision is
reasonably adapted to a legitimate end.  For similar reasons, plaintiffs’ asserted concern that, if the10
Similarly, the Virginia court’s summary conclusion that the minimum coverage provision10
is simply beyond “the letter and spirit of the constitution,” and thus invalid under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782, cannot be reconciled with controlling precedent.
The Virginia court reasoned that the provision imposes an “affirmative duty to engage in private
commerce,” or else to pay a penalty. Id. However, in Comstock the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that the federal government can, consistent with the Constitution’s “letter and spirit,”
impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to comport oneself in accord with the notions of
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Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision, there
is no limit to Congress’s authority, Pl. Opp. at 44, is misplaced. Again, plaintiffs rely on cases –
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York, 505 U.S. 144  – that address the proper
line between federal and state authority. But again, plaintiffs provide no explanation of how the
minimum coverage provision infringes on state sovereignty. Plaintiffs’ stated objection to the
provision – that, in their opinion, it infringes on individual liberty by compelling “inactive”
individuals to enter into a commercial transaction – has nothing to do with state sovereignty. While
the Constitution undoubtedly protects individual liberties, it does so through the Bill of Rights, not
through the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).  Plaintiffs’ arguments as to why the minimum coverage provision cannot11
be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause merely rehash their Commerce Clause
arguments, which in turn are really Due Process Clause arguments in disguise. The minimum
coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and the question of whether it infringes on individual liberty should be analyzed separately.
acceptable behavior that are inherent in a congressionally-defined criminal code, upon pain of
criminal sanction – as long as no other constitutional provision is violated. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
at 1957. Again, the proper focus of the Virginia court’s concern, and of plaintiffs’, is the Due
Process Clause, not the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause.
While the court in City of Madison v. Bear Creek Water Ass’n, 816 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (5th11
Cir. 1987), suggested that the “critical division of power between the federal and state governments”
was “a bulwark of protecting our individual liberties,” it also recognized that the Tenth Amendment
was not implicated unless a state’s ability to regulate in an area was “essential to its sovereignty.”
Plaintiffs have not even attempted to argue that a state’s ability to require its citizens to obtain health
insurance is essential to its sovereignty.
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C. Congress Had Independent Authority Under the General Welfare Clause To
Enact the Minimum Coverage Provision
As discussed in defendants’ opening brief, the minimum coverage provision is also a proper
exercise of Congress’s taxing power under the General Welfare Clause. Plaintiffs oppose Congress’s
authority under the General Welfare Clause on the basis that Congress did not call the § 5000A
penalty a “tax” and did not expressly invoke the General Welfare Clause in the provision’s
enactment. Pl. Opp. at 46, 50. However, plaintiffs fail to cite any authority for the notion that the
Constitution requires Congress to identify, in express terms, every enumerated power under which
a specific statutory provision is enacted, and well-established Supreme Court authority is to the
contrary. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 n.18 (1983) (“‘[T]he constitutionality of action
taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.’”
(quoting Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948))); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 78-79 (2000) (holding that the ADEA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment although Congress’s findings when enacting the ADEA had
only related to the Commerce Clause); Kusjanovic v. Oregon, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1138-39 (D.
Or. 2002) (applying the same reasoning to the FLSA). The fact that Congress included express
findings to support the provision’s enactment under the Commerce Clause, but not the General
Welfare Clause, is therefore irrelevant to the question of Congress’s constitutional authority to enact
the provision. Indeed, in other instances where Congress made such findings, courts have treated
regulatory assessments for health coverage as valid exercises of Congress’s taxing power. See, e.g.,
Adventure Res., Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 1998).  12
Even if Congress’s expressed intent were relevant, plaintiffs’ argument would fail. In12
debating the minimum coverage provision, Congressional leaders repeatedly and explicitly
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For purposes of determining whether the § 5000A penalty falls within Congress’s taxing
power, the fact that the penalty will raise public revenue is dispositive and requires the conclusion
that the penalty falls within Congress’s Article I authority. Plaintiffs are wrong in emphasizing the
notion that “what Congress called it – a penalty – and not a tax” is determinative. See Pl. Opp. at 50.
The semantic distinction between a “penalty” and a “tax” is not the difference between an apple and
an orange. In particular, there is no absolute distinction between penalties, when established by the
government, and “excise taxes,” which are taxes on an event. Both government-established penalties
and excise taxes raise revenue, and both are often used for regulatory purposes. E.g., United States
v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (recognizing that Congress’s power to impose excise taxes “is
extensive and sometimes falls with crushing effect on businesses deemed unessential or inimical to
the public welfare”). The overlap in meaning between these two terms is highlighted by the fact that
the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”), in its Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions
of the ACA, refers to the § 5000A penalty as an “excise tax.” See JCT, Technical Explanation, JCX-
18-10 (Mar. 21, 2010), at 31-34, 2 (amending two paragraphs on page 33). Similarly, the ACA’s
employer responsibility provision alternatively describes the same funds owed by certain employers
that fail to provide adequate coverage to their employees as a “payment,” 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), a
“tax” id. § 4980H(b)(2), and a “penalt[y],” id. § 4980H(d). Moreover, while the term “penalty” is
often deemed to denote a punitive assessment, the § 5000A penalty is not truly punitive in nature.
For example, as the JCT report emphasizes, the § 5000A penalty cannot be enforced through
defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power as well as an exercise of the commerce
power. See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); 156
Cong. Rec. H1824, H1826 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751,
S13,753 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,558, S13,581-82 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus).
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criminal sanctions or civil liens. JCT, Technical Explanation, at 33, 2. There is no scienter
requirement. And individuals whose income is below the poverty level, or who can show a
“hardship,” are not subject to the penalty, exceptions plainly out of place in a punitive measure. 26
U.S.C. § 5000A(e). The provision, plainly, encourages persons to obtain insurance, but it does
not operate as a punishment for those who do not. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45
(1950). The import of the § 5000A penalty is that individuals who fail to maintain a minimum level
of health insurance, and thus continue to risk shifting the cost of the health services they receive to
third parties, including the government, will at least be required to contribute revenue to the general
treasury, by some amount that is no more than the cost of insurance.
Plaintiffs also argue that Congress’s primary motive in enacting the minimum coverage
provision was regulatory rather than to raise revenues, and thus again seek to resurrect “distinctions
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes” long abandoned by the Supreme Court. Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974); cf. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 (“a federal excise tax
does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed”). Again, there
is simply no dispute that the § 5000A penalty will raise revenues, or that these revenues will be used
to defray government expenses. Moreover, the minimum coverage provision as a whole cannot be
deemed unrelated to raising revenue when it is aimed, to some degree, at protecting the public fisc
by requiring qualifying individuals to obtain health insurance, thereby preventing them from shifting
costs to third parties, including the federal government. There is no bright-line distinction between
a “tax” and a “penalty” based on whether an  assessment is at least 51% revenue-raising or at least
51% regulatory. See Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (rejecting the notion that a tax clearly designed to deter
trafficking in marijuana was beyond Congress’s general welfare power). Rather, the only exception
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to Congress’s broad authority to impose a tax with regulatory purposes under the General Welfare
Clause is where the object of regulation is otherwise “subject only to state regulation.” Kahriger,
345 U.S. at 31 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)). Again, plaintiffs have offered
no argument that regulation of the means of payment within the interstate market for health care
services is exclusively within the States’ regulatory power, nor is there any basis for such a
conclusion. Insofar as plaintiffs rely on the notion that the § 5000A penalty infringes on individual
liberties, they must raise such a claim under other constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process
Clause.13
Congress enacted 25 U.S.C. § 5000A as a taxing measure. It placed the provision in the
Internal Revenue Code, assessed the penalty according to the “taxable year” and with reference to
individuals’ income over the taxable year, required “taxpayers” to pay any penalty with their income
taxes when they file their tax return, and granted enforcement power to the Secretary of the
Treasury. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b). During the debate on the ACA, opponents of the bill repeatedly
attacked the minimum coverage provision as a tax, and proponents expressly defended it as an
exercise of the taxing power. To claim that Congress did not intend to invoke the taxing power is
to ignore the language of the statute and the legislative record that underlies it.
Plaintiffs’ further argument that the § 5000A penalty is not a tax because Congress applied13
the assessment and collection mechanisms for taxes to the penalty, through § 5000A(g)(1) and 26
U.S.C. § 6671, but determined, in § 5000A(g)(2),  that it would not impose criminal penalties, liens,
or levies for failure to pay it, Pl. Opp. at 53, also makes no sense. Plaintiffs are incorrect in
suggesting that these are the only enforcement mechanisms available in the Internal Revenue Code.
Id. The Secretary of the Treasury may engage in civil collection practices, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6306,
and may also offset the penalty amount against tax court judgments or refunds or credits that a
taxpayer would otherwise receive. JCT, Technical Explanation, at 33, 2.
-34-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 25    Filed 01/21/11   Page 43 of 52
D. The § 5000A Penalty Is Not an Unapportioned Capitation Tax or a Direct Tax
Plaintiffs’ argument that, if the § 5000A penalty is a tax, it is invalid under Article I, Section
9, is without merit. The penalty is not a capitation tax because it is not imposed “without regard to
property, profession, or any other circumstance.”  Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175
(1796) (opinion of Chase, J.); see also Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 444 (1868). The
penalty will be imposed only in certain circumstances – specifically, when a qualifying individual
fails to maintain minimum essential coverage during a particular month. Moreover, the minimum
coverage provision excepts individuals whose incomes are below the typical threshold for the filing
of a tax return, as well as those for whom the cost of qualifying coverage would exceed 8% of their
household income. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)-(2). The amount of the penalty varies according to the
taxpayer’s income, subject to a floor of a particular dollar amount and to a cap equal to the cost of
qualifying coverage. Id. § 5000A(c)(1)-(2). Such a tax, imposed on the occurrence of an event, and
varying according to individual circumstance, is an indirect tax that is not subject to Article I,
Section 9. United States v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 363 U.S. 194, 197-98 (1960); Tyler v. United
States, 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930); Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the § 5000A penalty is based on a “decision,” and is therefore not
based on an “event,” Pl. Opp. at 56, is without merit. The penalty is assessed when a qualifying
individual fails to meet the requirements set forth in § 5000A(a). It is not based on an individual’s
mere existence or ownership of property, any more than a penalty for failure to fulfill any other
statutory obligation. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4974 (tax on failure of retirement plans to distribute
assets); id. § 4980B (tax on failure of group health plan to extend coverage to beneficiary);
id. § 4980E (tax on failure of employer to make comparable Archer MSA contributions); id.
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§ 4942 (tax on failure of private foundation to distribute income). Plaintiffs’ assertion that the
penalty “falls on each American not otherwise excepted,” Pl. Opp. at 57, is nothing but a tautology,
equivalent to an assertion that a particular tax is imposed on everyone who is obligated to pay it. In
sum, plaintiffs fail to explain how the § 5000A penalty qualifies as a direct or capitation tax, and
their claim on this basis should be dismissed.
E. Because Plaintiffs Identify No Fundamental Right Implicated by the Minimum
Coverage Provision, Their Substantive Due Process Claim Must Be Rejected
While the Due Process Clause is the appropriate vehicle for plaintiffs’ challenge, plaintiffs
nevertheless cannot prevail on this ground because the minimum coverage provision violates no
fundamental individual right. In contending otherwise, plaintiffs suggest that the minimum coverage
provision implicates two separate “fundamental rights” – the “right to not enter into a contract for
the purchase [of] health insurance from a corporate stranger,” Pl. Opp. at 62, and the “right to not
share confidential medical information with a corporate stranger,” id. at 65. Neither of these
descriptions identifies a fundamental right that is implicated in this case. 
Plaintiffs’ first asserted “fundamental right” is plainly precluded under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence since the mid-1930s. Under that authority, the Due Process Clause requires only
rational basis review when a plaintiff asserts “economic rights and liberties.” See Florida, 716 F.
Supp. 2d at 1161 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), and New Motor Vehicle Bd.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978)). Plaintiffs’ contention that their asserted right “not
to contract” with a health insurance company, or “not to purchase” health insurance, is different in
kind from other economic rights because of its uniquely (according to plaintiffs) “coercive” quality,
Pl. Opp. at 73, is meritless. Any claim of a Due Process violation is in some sense complaining of
government coercion. It is well established, however, that Congress has the power to “adjust[] the
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burdens and benefits of economic life” without implicating any fundamental individual liberty.
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). Rather, such legislation is accorded “a
presumption of constitutionality.” Id. There is no reasoned basis for plaintiffs’ notion that
individuals who will almost inevitably receive health care services cannot be required to use a
particular payment method – one that must be set up prior to the receipt of health care but that, in
Congress’s rational determination, is an effective means of improving health care affordability and
availability for all. The true import of plaintiffs’ argument is that they have a “fundamental right”
to take the risk that, at the point when they require health care, their expenses will be greater than
they can afford, and these costs will be shifted to third parties, including the government, health care
providers, insurers, and other individuals. There is no such fundamental right to shift one’s health
care costs to others, and plaintiffs’ argument should therefore be rejected.
Plaintiffs have no claim with respect to their second asserted “fundamental” right – not to
disclose private medical information to a health insurance company – because, for one thing, the
minimum coverage provision does not, by its plain terms, require the disclosure of private medical
information. Rather, it is an economic measure that seeks to impose a particular means of payment
for future health care services. Significantly, plaintiffs have not alleged that they have been required
to disclose private medical information. As another district court has recognized, individuals such
as plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision on this ground because they
“do[] not, nor can [they] at this time, allege that [they] ha[ve] been compelled by the [ACA] to
provide personal information, that [their] personal information has been used improperly, or that use
of [their] personal information has in any way eroded [their] physician-patient privilege.” Baldwin,
2010 WL 3418436, at *4. To the extent plaintiffs speculate that all insurance plans available to them
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in 2014 will require them to provide private medical information, they cannot establish that this is
so, nor can they show that any such requirement would be particularly invasive or would result in
public disclosure. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) (recognizing that disclosures to
insurance companies do not constitute an impermissible invasion of privacy). Nothing in plaintiffs’
Complaint supports the notion that they have sustained, or are likely to suffer, an injury-in-fact on
this ground, nor that such an injury would be fairly traceable to the minimum coverage provision.
See Def. Op. Br. at 36. To the contrary, plaintiffs’ assertion that they have no intention of acquiring
health insurance, whether or not the minimum coverage provision is in effect, Comp. ¶ 26, requires
the conclusion that, even if others who do obtain health insurance face such a threat, no such injury
is “certainly impending” for these plaintiffs. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 226. 
In any event, even if plaintiffs had standing to raise such a claim, it must fail. As the Florida
court explained, the Supreme Court has not recognized a fundamental right of the kind that plaintiffs
seek to identify here. Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.  Because the minimum coverage provision14
easily satisfies rational basis review, plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims must be dismissed.
 
In NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530, 2011 WL 148254, at *8 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2011), the Supreme14
Court declined to decide whether there existed a “privacy interest of constitutional significance”
with respect to individuals’ claims  of information privacy rights. The Court held, however, that
even assuming such a right, there was no violation where statutory safeguards – similar to those that
HIPAA, Pub. L.  No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), provides for personally-identifying health
information collected by an insurance company, see Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 570-71 (5th Cir.
2006) – prevent public disclosure of the information at issue. NASA, 2011 WL 148254, at *12.
Justices Scalia and Thomas would have held that “[a] federal constitutional right to ‘informational
privacy’ does not exist.” Id. at *15 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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F. Lieutenant Governor Bryant’s Tenth Amendment Claim Should Be Dismissed
1. Lt. Gov. Bryant Lacks Standing To Assert a Tenth Amendment
Commandeering Claim
As explained in defendants’ opening brief, Lieutenant Governor Bryant lacks standing, based
merely on his status as a state employee, to assert that the ACA “commandeers” state governments
and officials in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Def. Op. Br. at 41-43. The few contrary cases
cited by the Lieutenant Governor in his separate opposition brief do not overcome the weight of
authority cited by defendants, including authority from a member of this Court. See id. at 42 (citing
United States v. Johnson, 652 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726 (S.D. Miss. 2009), as well as cases from five
other Circuits). Indeed, most of the Lieutenant Governor’s cited cases merely assumed standing
without deciding the issue – at a time prior to the Supreme Court’s instruction that courts should not
proceed in such a manner – because the plaintiff’s claim was “so patently without merit.” E.g.,
Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981). 
In addition, the Lieutenant Governor has simply not alleged a plausible injury-in-fact that
is fairly traceable to the provisions that, he apparently asserts, violate the Tenth Amendment.  His15
separate opposition brief makes no attempt to explain how he is injured by ACA provisions that
require certain employers to offer particular health insurance coverage to their employees, nor does
he clarify whether the State of Mississippi is included among those covered employers or whether
the State of Mississippi will have to change the coverage that it already provides in order to comply
with the ACA. The only injury discernible from the Lieutenant Governor’s allegations – that he will
As observed in defendants’ opening brief, the Complaint does not actually identify the15
ACA provisions that relate to employers, which appear to be the only provisions potentially relevant
to the lieutenant governor’s Tenth Amendment claim. See Def. Op. Br. at 43 n.18.
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be required to maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage – is the same injury alleged
by other plaintiffs, which they ascribe to the minimum coverage provision, not to the provisions
directed at employers.  The absence of an injury-in-fact here stands in stark contrast to the two16
cases that the Lieutenant Governor identifies as holding that standing existed; in each of those cases,
the court identified an injury-in-fact resulting from the challenged statutory provision, even if that
injury had no “nexus” with the Tenth Amendment issue. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185
F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of the ability to carry a gun due
to the challenged law); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n.16
(11th Cir. 1982) (court observed that plaintiffs had demonstrated the requisite injury in fact and
causal connection to the challenged provision). Because the authority cited by the Lieutenant
Governor does not support his standing to assert a Tenth Amendment commandeering challenge to
the ACA’s employer provisions, his claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
2. The ACA’s Employer Provisions Do Not Infringe on State Sovereignty
Even if the Lieutenant Governor had standing to assert a Tenth Amendment
“commandeering” claim, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The fact that
While the Lieutenant Governor claims that the employer provisions will dictate the “terms16
and conditions” of his employment, he points to no ACA requirement that employees accept the
insurance offered by their employers. Thus, any injury he might assert could only be whatever injury
might result from the minimum coverage provision. At the same time, the Complaint appears to
indicate that the Lieutenant Governor has insurance through his employer, Comp. ¶ 97, and does not
suggest that he has any intention of dropping it. Because the Lieutenant Governor may well already
satisfy the requirements of the minimum coverage provision, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(B), (2)(A),
he has failed to establish that he has standing to assert any of the claims set forth in the Complaint,
regardless of whether the other plaintiffs have sufficiently established standing.
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the ACA provisions for “employers” do not exclude state governments does not constitute any form
of commandeering. No state official is required to carry out federal policy. Rather, state employers
are simply required to follow the same rules that other employers must follow. The Lieutenant
Governor’s citation of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), is inapposite. That case suggested
that a federal law that interfered with a state’s ability to impose an age limit for state judges might
infringe on state sovereignty because it would affect the state’s ability to determine the qualifications
for its highest government officials. Id. at 459 (ultimately concluded that no such infringement had
occurred in that case because the ADEA did not, by its plain terms, apply to state judges). Gregory
has no possible application here because, insofar as the ACA employer provisions might impact the
nature of benefits provided to State of Mississippi employees (something that the Lieutenant
Governor has failed to establish), such an impact would not affect the State’s ability to determine
the qualifications of its officers. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554
(1985) (upholding application of FLSA overtime- and minimum-wage requirements against city’s
Tenth Amendment challenge); EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239 (recognizing Congress’s exercise of its
commerce power could apply to states and state employees without violating the Tenth Amendment
where the federal law had no direct impact on “attributes of state sovereignty”), abrogated on other
grounds by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
Indeed, the district court in the Florida ACA challenge rejected the same claim brought by
the State of Mississippi itself: “the mere fact that the states will be required to provide the same
healthcare benefits to employees as private employers does not, by itself, implicate or interfere with
state functions and sovereignty.” Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. As the court noted, “to some
extent Congress already regulates health benefits for state employees, for example, with respect to
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COBRA’s temporary continuation of coverage provisions and HIPAA’s restrictions on the ability 
of group plans to deny coverage due to preexisting conditions.” Id. at 1153. The Lieutenant
Governor’s commandeering claim should therefore be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in defendants’ opening brief, this case should
be dismissed in its entirety.
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